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1. INTRODUCTION
The European Union ("EU") has worked incessantly to achieve
its lofty goal of establishing a more unified European continent.
The Treaty of Nice is the third major treaty revision of the EU in
the past ten years. The Treaty of Maastricht, more commonly
known as the Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), went into force
in 1993, establishing what is currently referred to as the "European
Union."' The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997, entered
into force in 1999, and has added to and amended the foundational
TEU.2 The main purposes of the EU treaties are twofold: First, to
adopt a structure that enables current EU members to interact and
function cohesively, while leaving some of the specific means of
achieving the goals of the EU to the member states; and second, to
ease the transition for countries that hope to gain EU membership.
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1 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter TEU].
2 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS,
Oct. 2,1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM].
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The critical issue at Nice was the adoption of amendments to
the TEU that would ease the "enlargement" process for twelve
non-member countries seeking membership into the EU as early as
2004. Many of these issues were not resolved at Amsterdam, and
the Treaty of Nice was meant to provide some solutions. Although
there was a political agreement reached at Nice among all of the
member countries' representatives, the Treaty of Nice could not go
into force without all fifteen member countries ratifying the Treaty.
This ratification could be achieved either by legislative approval or
by a referendum, in which the citizens of the member countries
would vote.
The citizens of Ireland, whose constitution requires a referen-
dum, rejected the Treaty of Nice on June 7, 2001. 3 This created a
dilemma, as the Treaty of Nice could not go into force without rati-
fication by all EU members. The Irish government staged a strong
pro-Nice campaign to convince its citizens that ratification of the
Treaty was essential for enlargement and would not jeopardize Ire-
land's neutral military position. Ireland held a second referendum
on October 19, 2002, and this time the citizens adopted a constitu-
tional amendment allowing Ireland to ratify the Treaty of Nice.
This is not to say that everyone is satisfied with the current
enlargement process. Many EU citizens question the governmental
bodies' motives for wanting to achieve enlargement. Citizens are
wary that enlargement will not be in their best economic interests.
The EU has taken substantial steps towards enlargement and they
insist that the enlargement schedule must be maintained. They be-
lieve that enlargement is the best solution to achieve their political
and economic goals.
It is beneficial to first look at the recent history of the EU, its
treaties, and the ultimate goals of enlargement. Section 2 of this
Comment looks at how the EU has positioned itself in recent years
to allow enlargement to become a reality. This Section also looks at
the present state of enlargement and the countries interested in
seeking EU membership. Section 3 of this Comment analyzes the
potential economic consequences of enlargement on the existing
EU members and the candidates for membership. This Section fo-
cuses on the potential economic impact of the candidates' entrance
into the EU, as it is uncertain what the ultimate effects of such a
move will be.
3 See infra note 151.
226 [24:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss1/4
THE TREATY OF NICE
Section 4 is an in-depth analysis of the Treaty of Nice and how
the EU focused its efforts towards enlargement. It will also detail
the purposes of the Treaty of Nice, with attention paid to the
Treaty of Amsterdam and its shortcomings. Section 5 describes the
ratification process for the Treaty of Nice and the emergence of the
Irish referenda. Section 5 also analyzes public opinion on enlarge-
ment. In Section 6, this Comment concludes that although the EU
has successfully achieved its goals of ratification and has main-
tained its enlargement timetable, there is still much work to be
done with respect to democratic representation and gaining the
confidence of current EU citizens.
2. ENLARGEMENT
The present enlargement process is the most aggressive, ambi-
tious project that the EU has ever undertaken.4 There are currently
thirteen countries seeking membership into the EU: Ten Central
and Eastern European Countries ("CEECs") (Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia), as well as Cyprus, Malta, and
Turkey. Each of these countries applied for membership at differ-
ent dates, which ranged from 1987 to 1996.5 The goal of enlarge-
ment is not to add all of the countries simultaneously, but to add
each independently to achieve an EU of twenty-seven members by
the end of 2009.6 When the EU finally enlarges to twenty-seven
members, the CEECs, Cyprus, and Malta will be integrated into the
EU. However, these countries have already developed substantial
relationships with the EU through the Europe Agreements and the
4 The EU currently consists of fifteen members, six of which were founding
members: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
The others were added during four separate enlargements: (1) In 1973, Denmark,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom were added; (2) In 1981, Greece joined; (3) In
1986, Portugal and Spain joined; and (4) In 1995, Austria, Sweden, and Finland
were the last additions. EUROPEAN UNION, EU ENLARGEMENT-A HISTORIc
OPPORTUNITY [hereinafter EU ENLARGEMENT], at http://europa.eu.int/comm
/enlargement/intro/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 7,2003).
5 See EUROPEAN UNION, NEGOTIATIONS [hereinafter NEGOTIATIONS], at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/index.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2003), for a comprehensive list of each applicant country's application date.
6 Turkey continues to seek membership in the EU, but has not fully achieved
the political, economic, or acquis criteria necessary for membership. Towards the
Enlarged Union: Strategy Paper from the Commission on the Progress Towards
Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, COM(2002)700 final at 21 [herein-
after Strategy Paper 2002].
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EU has previously established the procedural guidelines that these
countries must follow to achieve membership status.
2.1. Europe Agreements
The collapse of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe
and the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. tore down many of the political
and trade barriers that previously existed between the old Com-
munist countries and the Western world. The newly-formed and
preexisting countries were left in disarray, but opportunities to
trade freely with Western European countries became possible.
Between 1991 and 1996, all of the CEECs signed association agree-
ments, known as the Europe Agreements, 7 with the EU, which es-
tablished bilateral relations between the associated CEECs and the
EU. 8 The Europe Agreements support economic, political, and so-
cial relationships with the purpose of converging interests. 9 This
7 The Official Journal of the European Communities published the Council's
and Commission's Decisions to approve the Europe Agreements. Hungary and
Poland signed their Europe Agreements in 1991. Commission Decision 93/743,
1993 O.J. (L 348) 1; Commission Decision 93/742, 1993 O.J. (L 347) 1. In 1993, Ro-
mania, Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic, and the Czech Republic signed their Europe
Agreements. Commission Decision 94/910, 1994 O.J. (L 360) 1; Commission De-
cision 94/909, 1994 O.J. (L 359) 1; Commission Decision 94/908, 1994 O.J. (L 358)
1; Commission Decision 94/907, 1994 O.J. (L 357) 1. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithua-
nia signed their Europe Agreements in 1995. Commission Decision 98/180, 1998
O.J. (L 68) 1, 2; Commission Decision 98/150, 1998 O.J. (L 51) 1, 2; Commission
Decision 98/98, 1998 O.J. (L 26) 1, 2. The last CEEC, Slovenia, signed its Europe
Agreement in 1996. Commission Decision 99/144, 1999 O.J. (L 51) 1, 2. Europa,
the official website of the EU, provides a comprehensive chart containing each
applicant country, the date it signed its Europe Agreement, the date the Europe
Agreement went into force, the date each applicant officially applied for EU
membership, and a link to the text of each applicant's Europe Agreement. See
generally European Union, Europa: The European Union On-Line [hereinafter
Europa], at http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/europe-agr.htm for
citations of this material.
8 This section refers to the Europe Agreements signed by the CEECs and the
EU. Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus had signed their association agreements with the
European Economic Community (EEC) years earlier. Council Regulation
1246/73,1973 J.O. (L 133) 1; Council Regulation 492/71, 1971 J.O. (L 61) 1; Council
Decision 64/733, 1964 J.O. (L 217) 1. See generally Europa, supra note 7, for cita-
tions of these and other helpful materials.
9 The Europe Agreement between Poland and the EU states that the purpose
of the Agreement is:
[T]o provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue.., to
promote the expansion of trade and the harmonious economic relations
between the parties.., to provide a basis for the Community's financial
and technical assistance to Poland, to provide an appropriate framework
for Poland's gradual integration into the Community. To this end, Po-
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Subsection will focus specifically on the economic relations be-
tween the CEECs and the EU.
The Europe Agreements' major economic impact is that the EU
began to assist, and continued assisting, the CEECs in the creation
and development of their new market economies. The Europe
Agreements encourage reciprocal, yet asymmetrical, trade rela-
tions between the associated countries and the EU by virtually
eliminating restrictions on industrial goods that the CEECs export
to the EU members, while allowing the CEECs to continue to tax
EU imports.'0 By January 1, 1997, tariffs were eliminated from
most CEEC exports to the EU, except for agricultural goods." Al-
though foreign trade with the CEECs is less significant for EU
members, the Europe Agreements' success for the CEECs is evi-
dent from the fact that over half of the CEECs' foreign trade is with
EU members.12 In addition to trade relations, the Europe Agree-
ments have positively altered CEEC relations with the EU concern-
ing the free movement of capital and labor. The results are similar
to that of trade relations, where the impact on the CEECs is far
more significant than the impact on the EU;13 however, overall, the
Europe Agreements have provided benefits to both the CEECs and
the EU.14
The Europe Agreements have also had a phenomenal effect on
the transformation of the CEECs into market economies. They
provide the basic framework from which full integration into the
land shall work towards fulfilling the necessary conditions, to promote
cooperation in cultural matters.
Commission Decision 93/743, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 348) 3.
10 DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, ENLARGEMENT PAPERS: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT 21
(2001) [hereinafter ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT], at http://europa.eu.int
/ comm/economy-finance/publications/enlargementLpapers/enlargementpaper
s04_en.htm. See CHRISTIAN WEISE ET AL., GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC
RESEARCH & EUROPEAN POLICIES RESEARCH CENTER, THE IMPACT OF EU
ENLARGEMENT ON COHESION 79 (2001) [hereinafter IMPACT ON COHESION] (analyzing
the effects of enlargement on EU-CEEC trade patterns), at http://www.diwberlin
.de/programme/cgi/index.cgi?automatic=l&c=/english/abtielungen/wlt/publi
kationen/content.html.
11 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 10, at 21.
12 Id. at 23.
13 Id. at 24.
14 From 1994 to 1999, the CEEC's average gross domestic product ("GDP")
growth was 3.5% per year and the average EU member's GDP growth was 2.25%
per year. Id. at 26.
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EU is to be achieved. It may seem as if the EU and the CEECs have
little to gain through the CEECs' full integration into the EU, but
there are still advantages and privileges of full membership, which
the CEECs could not achieve without joining the EU.15
2.2. Accession Criteria and the Pre-Accession Process
Every country seeking membership into the EU has been given
an extensive list of the broad and specific requirements that must
be met before its application for membership will be considered
and accepted. The current membership criteria have been devel-
oped over the past nine years through a number of conferences
and summits. There were three significant events that led to the
finalization of the accession criteria, which established the founda-
tion of the current enlargement scenario: (1) the Copenhagen
European Council summit in 1993; (2) the European Commission's
("the Commission's") report, Agenda 2000, and its relevant Opin-
ions and Reports; and (3) the Luxembourg European Council
summit in 1997.
2.2.1. Copenhagen European Council
In 1993, the Council of the European Union held its meeting in
Copenhagen, realizing that enlargement was soon approaching.
The parties agreed that "the associated countries in Central and
Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the Euro-
pean Union."16 Membership requirements, now known as the Co-
penhagen Criteria, were determined, 17 but no specific countries
were targeted, nor were any definitive dates given. Even without
the specifics, the political, economic, and institutional criteria were
15 See infra Section 3 (analyzing the economic impact of enlargement on the
CEECs).
16 Presidency Conclusions from the Copenhagen European Council, June 21-
22,1993, § 7(A)(iii) [hereinafter Copenhagen Conclusions], at http://europa.eu.int
/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=DOC/93/3 10 1 AGED&lg
=EN&display=.
17 There are four broad membership requirements that applicants must sat-
isfy: (1) Applicants must undergo institutional reform to conform with the EU's
institutional policies promoting democracy; (2) Applicants must promote the es-
tablishment of their market economies and be able to cope with market forces; (3)
The applicants must be able to adhere to the obligations of EU membership with
regard to economic and political union; and (4) Applicants must condition their
national procedures to allow for the integration of EU law into domestic law. Id.
Annex II.
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settled and the CEECs and other potential countries could begin
focusing their efforts towards gaining membership.
The aforementioned Europe Agreements were entered into
soon after the Copenhagen European Council agreed on these cri-
teria; all of the Europe Agreements are focused on fulfilling the
Copenhagen Criteria.18 The criteria provided guidance to both
sides, defining EU-CEEC relations via the Europe Agreements. Be-
tween 1994 and 1996, all ten CEECs applied for EU membership,19
and fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria is the first major step
for the CEECs to achieve accession.
2.2.2. Agenda 2000 and the Commission's Opinions
In July 1997, the Commission presented its Agenda 2000 re-
port,20 which broadly communicated the EU's objectives for the
21st century concerning the reform of EU policies, enlargement,
and the EU's financial framework. 21 Specifically with relation to
enlargement, Agenda 2000 provided that the EU would continue to
foster an encouraging environment for enlargement, with the in-
crease of funds to the CEECs. 22 Also, the EU would continue to
provide support to the CEECs by monitoring the Accession Part-
nerships, which include the Europe Agreements and other multi-
national programs. As the Copenhagen Criteria established the
18 See, e.g., Commission Decision 94/907, art. 1, 1994 O.J. (L 357) 5 (stating
that the objectives of Romania's Europe Agreement are to fulfill the four criteria
set forth in Copenhagen).
19 The following is a chronological list of the applicants and their application
years: Turkey (1987), Cyprus (1990), Malta (1990), Hungary (1994), Poland (1994),
Romania (1995), Estonia (1995), Lithuania (1995), Bulgaria (1995), Slovakia (1995),
Latvia (1995), the Czech Republic (1996), and Slovenia (1996). EU ENLARGMENT,
supra note 4.
20 Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Europe from the Commission to
the Council of the European Union, COM(97)2000 final [hereinafter Agenda 2000],
at http://europa.eu.int/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&Dosld=20085
#20516. However, analyses and summaries are more prevalent. See, e.g.,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTIVITiEs OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION paras. 29-44 (1997) (summarizing the Commission's conclusions from
Agenda 2000).
21 Agenda 2000 has spawned a variety of legislation and resolutions from the
EU's institutions. See, e.g., Parliament Resolution on the Communication from
the Commission on Agenda 2000, 1997 O.J. (C 38) 31, in which the Parliament
gives its opinions and conclusions concerning the Agenda 2000 report.
22 EU INFORMATION CENTRE, OVERVIEW OF THE PHARE PROGRAMME AND THE
NEW PREACCESSION FUNDS (1999) [hereinafter PHARE PROGRAMME], at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/publist.htm.
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pre-accession criteria for the CEECs and other countries, Agenda
2000 provided part of the procedural framework from which
enlargement developed.
Agenda 2000 also focused on three categories of criteria that the
applicants must achieve during the pre-accession process.23 First,
the political criteria concern the applicants' political regimes' "re-
spect for democracy and human rights,"24 with emphasis on con-
verging the applicants' general political views with those of the
EU. The economic criteria represent the greatest disparity among
the CEECs, Malta, and Cyprus.25 The CEECs had the difficult task
of forming market economies that could withstand strong competi-
tive forces. For many of the CEECs that were previously part of
the Soviet bloc, this meant dismantling their previously function-
ing systems and literally starting over again with no foundation in
place. The last criteria concern the applicants' ability to adopt the
"acquis communautaire," the ability to develop the necessary legal
avenues to allow EU law, and most importantly, the EU's major
treaties, which must become the applicant countries' laws upon
membership. 26
The EU's membership criteria require many applicants to dis-
mantle functioning legal and economic systems, as well as decon-
struct long-lasting political ideologies - tasks that do not come
without a significant price. Agenda 2000 developed the idea of a
financial system wherein the EU would contribute a significant
amount of funds through various programs, such as Phare, to the
CEECs to help meet some of the costs of the pre-accession process.
23 These criteria re-emphasize the Copenhagen Criteria. Copeahagen Con-
clusions, supra note 16, at Annex II.
24 EUROPEAN UNION, ENLARGEMENT OF THE UNION § 6 (2001), at http://europa
.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e40001. htm.
25 The economic criteria, including establishment of a market economy and
the ability to withstand market forces, were the main reason why the EU chose to
begin negotiations with Cyprus, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, and the
Czech Republic. Id. at § 7; see infra Section 2.2.3 (discussing the Luxembourg
European Council).
26 The Agenda 2000 report suggested that each applicant develop a plan for
acquiring the EU's acquis. Each applicant devised a National Program for the
Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). Acquis includes: (1) Adoption of principles and
laws of EU treaties; (2) Secondary legislation and jurisprudence; and (3) declara-
tions and resolutions. For a comprehensive list, see, for example, HUNGARY,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR THE ADOImON OF THE
ACQUIS (2001), at http://www.mfa.gov.hu/euanyag/NPAA/Cover.htm.
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In July 1997, the Commission issued its opinion on the status of
each CEEC's application for EU membership. 27 The Commission
evaluated various reports issued by the applicant countries and the
bodies of the EU. These opinions encompassed the Commission's
views on the steps the applicants had taken to meet the accession
criteria set forth in Copenhagen.28 They concluded that the EU
should begin accession negotiations for enlargement with six of the
applicant countries: Five CEECs (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slo-
venia, Estonia, and Hungary) and Cyprus.29 At each meeting after
1997, the Commission has issued regular reports on the status of
the applicant countries.30
2.2.3. Luxembourg European Council
In December 1997, only four months after the Commission
issued its Agenda 2000 report, the European Council held its
summit in Luxembourg and accepted the Commission's recom-
mendations concerning enlargement. 31 They undertook the task of
developing the current enlargement process by implementing a
27 For a complete link to the Commission's opinions on every CEEC's appli-
cation, see EUROPEAN UNION, EU ENLARGEMENT -A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY (2000)
[hereinafter HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY], at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement
/intro/ag2000_opinions.htm.
28 The opinions also offered predictions of each CEEC's progress towards
enlargement. See, e.g., Commission Opinion on Bulgaria's Application for Mem-
bership of the European Union, COM(97)2008 final at 36 (predicting Bulgaria's
ability to cope with market pressures), at http://europa.eu.int/comm
/enlargement/bulgaria/index.htm.
29 HISTORIc OPPORTUNITY, supra note 27 (locating all of the Opinions). The
Conclusion section of each Opinion states how well the applicant has progressed
in establishing the Copenhagen Criteria; the Commission decided that six appli-
cants were ready to begin negotiations. See, e.g., Commission Opinion on Hun-
gary's Application for Membership of the European Union, COM(97) 2001 final
(concluding that Hungary was successful in preparing itself to begin accession
negotiations), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/hungary/index.htm.
30 In June 1997, the Council summit in Luxembourg concluded that the
Commission should continue to submit progress reports concerning the status of
each CEEC's progress. Presidency Conclusions from the Luxembourg European
Council, Dec. 12, 1997, para. 38 [hereinafter Luxembourg Conclusionsj, at
http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/index.htm. In 1999, the Commission con-
cluded that the EU should be ready in 2002 to begin formal negotiations with the
CEECs who have met their criteria. Reports on Progress Towards Accession by
Each of the Candidate Countries: Composite Paper on the Commission Reports,
COM(99)0500 final at 39 [hereinafter Composite Paper], at http://europa.eu.int
/comm/enlargement/reportj10_99/index.htm#2.
31 Luxembourg Conclusions, supra note 30, para. 10.
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plan that European non-member countries must follow in order to
meet the political, economic, and institutional goals of the EU.32
Furthermore, the plan includes the EU's role in facilitating the
enlargement process.33
The plan includes four major parts. First, the Luxembourg
European Council creates the European Conference, a series of
meetings between the EU's and applicants' representatives, to en-
sure that the applicants understand and adhere to the EU's politi-
cal and social agenda.34 Second, the Council details the pre-
accession strategy for any European country hoping to obtain EU
membership. 35 The pre-accession strategy assumes that the rela-
tionships fostered by the Europe Agreements would continue. In
addition, the strategy introduces the new accession partnerships, 36
including the Phare program, as the main source of EU contribu-
tion to the applicants.37 Third, the plan formally adopts the
recommendations of the Commission and announced that
accession negotiations would officially begin with Cyprus, Poland,
Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic.38 Fourth, the
Council concludes that the Commission should continue to execute
progress reports and make recommendations concerning the status
32 Id. paras. 2-3.
33 Id. para. 17.
34 "The members of the Conference must share a common commitment to
peace, security and good neighbourliness, respect for other countries' sovereignty,
the principles upon which the European Union is founded .... " Id. para. 5.
35 See HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY, supra note 27 (summarizing the parts of the
enlargement process from Luxembourg).
36 The Accession Partnerships provide the CEECs with a guide to meeting the
EU's acquis, as well as establish the financial means by which they are to support
their acts. Luxembourg Conclusions, supra note 30, paras. 14-16. Each CEEC en-
tered an Accession Partnership with the EU in 1998. See, e.g., Commission Com-
munication on Information from the Commission-Bulgaria: Accession Partner-
ship, 1998 O.J. (C 202) 1-6 [hereinafter Bulgaria Communication] (outlining the
short-term, medium-term, and long-term goals for Bulgaria in the Accession Part-
nership).
37 The Phare program started as a financial assistance program for Central
and Eastern European countries in 1989, with the goal of encouraging those coun-
tries to develop new political and economic regimes after the Cold War ended.
The Luxembourg Council announced Phare's complete devotion to the pre-
accession process for applicant countries. For a complete history and guide to the
Phare program, see PHARE PROGRAMME, supra note 22. "The Phare programme is
the main financial instrument of the reinforced pre-accession strategy." Bulgaria
Communication, supra note 36, § 5.1.
38 Luxembourg Conclusions, supra note 30, para. 27.
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gress reports and make recommendations concerning the status of
the CEECs in connection with the Copenhagen Criteria.
39
The Luxembourg Summit was a significant step in the
enlargement process. The EU's long-term goal of enlargement,
which had started as a broad, conceptual idea, now had the requi-
site form for success. The Council commenced accession negotia-
tions with six applicants, and the others soon followed. With the
framework in place, the EU and the applicants were left to deal
with the substantive negotiation processes.
2.3. The State of Enlargement After Luxembourg
This is not to say that after 1997 all of the groundwork for
enlargement was completed. Rather, this Section illustrates some
of the foundational events within the EU institutions that have con-
tributed to the enlargement process up until 1997.40 Remaining
specific issues required acknowledgement and attention, but the
success of the earlier planning meant that the other applicants and
potential candidates now had a roadmap to follow in pursuit of
membership. As enlargement nears, the Council continues to hold
summits and to work on the details of effectuating enlargement.
41
In 1999, the Helsinki European Council concluded that the In-
tergovernmental Conference ("IGC") would convene in 2000 with
the main purpose of amending the EU laws to help further the
goals of a largely expanded EU.42 The Council also agreed that
39 Id.
40 The Commission prepared a follow-up report to Agenda 2000, called Strat-
egy 2000, along with its Regular Reports in 2000, which set up a roadmap for the
accession process from 2000-2002. Enlargement Strategy Paper-Report on Pro-
gress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries [hereinafter Strategy
Paper 20001, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportL_00/index
.htm#1 (last visited Feb. 8, 2003). The Nice Council accepted in December 2000
the Commission's roadmap as a positive guide for enlargement. Presidency Con-
clusions from the Nice European Council, Dec. 2000, para. 5 [hereinafter Nice
Conclusions], at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action
.gettxt=gt&doc=DOC/O0/30 10 1 RAPID&lg=EN.
41 In December 2001, the President concluded in Laeken that "the accession
process... is now irreversible," and maintained that the EU's goals should still be
to continue with enlargement in 2002. Presidency Conclusions from the Laeken
European Council, Dec. 2001, paras. 7-8 [hereinafter Laeken Conclusions], at
http://ue.eu.int/en/Info /eurocouncil/index.htm.
42 Presidency Conclusions from the Helsinki European Council, Dec. 1999,
para. 5 [hereinafter Helsinki Conclusions], at http://ue.eu.int/en/Info
/eurocouncil/index.htm. IGC 2000 met in Nice and made various amendments
to the main treaties of the EU via the Treaty of Nice. See infra Section 4 & notes 80-
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once the IGC results were ratified, the first countries would obtain
EU membership by 2002.43 Eventually, at the Santa Maria da Feira
European Council in June 2000, the Council announced that it
would open negotiations with the remaining group of nations:
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, and Malta.44
2.4. Accession Negotiations
The EU has officially opened accession negotiations with the
twelve aforementioned applicant countries. The first group, Hun-
gary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Cyprus,
began negotiations on March 31, 1998. The second group, Roma-
nia, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Malta,
commenced negotiations on October 13, 1999.45 However, the ap-
plicant countries will not receive membership at the same time;
negotiations are conducted bilaterally, between the EU and each
applicant.
2.4.1. The Accession Negotiation Process
The applicant countries must develop and implement strategies
concerning thirty-one separate chapters, which together form the
EU's acquis.46 The goal is to have the applicants conform their na-
tional laws with those of the EU, which are based on the EU trea-
ties. Each applicant works closely with the Commission, which
keeps track of their progress and helps deal with any significant
problems that occur. Accession negotiations are lengthy, as the
Council must unanimously approve each chapter before it is
closed.
Each applicant is eligible to receive membership only when all
thirty-one chapters have been closed. After the applicant receives
81 (discussing the Treaty of Nice, enlargement, and the background study for the
second cohesion report).
43 Helsinki Conclusions, supra note 42, para. 5.
44 Council Presidency Conclusions from the European Council in Santa Maria
da Feira, June 2000, para. 13, at http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil
/index.htm.
45 NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 5.
46 Some examples of negotiations chapters are Chapter 1: Free Movement of
Goods, Chapter 2: Free Movement of Persons, Chapter 10: Taxation, and Chapter
30: Institutions. For a comprehensive list, see EUROPEAN UNION, ENLARGEMENT-
CHAPTERS OF THE AcQuis [hereinafter CHAPTERS OF THE ACQUIS], at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/index.htm (last
updated Dec. 30, 2002).
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the approval of the Council and the EU Parliament,47 each of the
existing EU member countries and the applicant countries must rat-
ify the accession treaty according to their domestic constitutional
requirements.48 Finally, if the applicant country and all of the EU
member countries ratify the treaty, the applicant will achieve EU
membership.
2.4.2. Accession Negotiation Progress
Since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, 2002 was expected to be the
year in which the first applicant countries were to achieve mem-
bership status.49 The Council's optimistic timeframe has, for the
most part, been successful, since ten of the applicants concluded
accession negotiations by the end of 2002.50 Cyprus, the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia have completed negotiations for all
thirty-one chapters.
5 '
On October 9, 2002, the Commission recommended that the EU
conclude negotiations with ten of the candidates.5 2 The Commis-
sion further decided that these ten candidates were to be ready for
full membership by the beginning of 2004.53 The Commission
stated that the EU would offer its support to Romania and Bulgaria
to continue negotiations, with the hope that they would be ready
for membership in 2007.54 Bulgaria has concluded negotiations on
twenty-four chapters, and Romania has concluded negotiations on
only sixteen chapters. 55 Turkey will continue its pre-accession ne-
47 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 1.15.
48 Id.
49 Laeken Conclusions, supra note 41, para. 7.
50 The EU has prepared a table charting each applicant's progress in negotiat-
ing the thirty-one chapters of the EU's acquis. EUROPEAN UNION, ACCESSION
NEGOTIATIONS: STATE OF PLAY DECEMBER 2002, at http://www.europa.eu.int
/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/index.htm.
51 Id.
52 On October 9, 2002, the Commission released its monumental Strategy Pa-
per, which concluded that the ten candidates were nearing membership status.
Strategy Paper 2002, supra note 6, at 33.
53 Id. After the Commission issued its Strategy Paper 2002, the Council
slightly amended the timeframe for enlargement by concluding that the ten can-
didates are to achieve full membership status on May 1, 2004. Copenhagen Con-
clusions, supra note 16, para. 3.
54 Strategy Paper 2002, supra note 6, at 34.
55 See CHAPTERS OF THE ACQUIS, supra note 46 (describing the various chapters
that must be negotiated).
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gotiations; the Commission has not set a definitive timetable for
Turkey's membership.5 6
3. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT
Enlargement is not a fixed point in time when the EU will in-
stantly change from its current fifteen members to twenty-seven
members. There is no single event that defines enlargement; in-
stead, EU enlargement will be the result of a dynamic process
stemming from the vision of the EU's governing bodies. The
Europe Agreements maintain their status as the foundation for bi-
lateral relations between the CEECs and the EU.57 The Europe
Agreements accomplished most of the economic goals of EU-CEEC
relations through trade and foreign direct investment. The ques-
tion arises as to what economic gains the EU and the CEECs can
achieve through completing the enlargement process.
There are conflicting views on whether enlargement will have
any additional economic benefits. Advocates of enlargement point
to the potential for increased trade and investment, which would
increase the gross domestic product ("GDP") of the existing mem-
bers, the CEECs, and, therefore, the EU as a whole.5 8 The skeptics
claim that enlargement is more of a political ploy, rather than a
beneficial economic decision, which will stagnate EU economic de-
velopment because the current members will have to support the
slowly developing CEEC economies. 59 Presently, the arguments
for and against the economic benefits of EU enlargement are just
that, arguments. Both sides have their economic models illustrat-
ing their opinions; however, these models are based on numerous
assumptions that may or may not be true. This Section will ana-
lyze the arguments with regard to trade and investment.
56 Strategy Paper 2002, supra note 6, at 35.
57 See supra Section 2.1 (describing the role played by the Europe Agreements
in establishing CEEC-EU relations).
-% Enlargement supporters point to the increase in GDP in the EU and the
CEECs since the inception of the Europe Agreement. See supra note 14 and ac-
companying text (noting that the CEECs' average gross domestic product growth
exceeded that of the EU for the period 1994-1999). They infer from this increase in
GDP that since enlargement will remove all of the barriers to trade and invest-
ment, GDP will only continue to increase.
59 See ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 10, at 27-28 (describing
the likelihood of slow growth rates in the CEECs).
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3.1. Trade
The EU and the CEECs have increased trade relations since the
adoption of the Europe Agreements, which removed many of the
trade barriers between the countries. 60 The CEECs have taken ad-
vantage of these relations by exporting most of their goods to EU
members.61 Overall, the figures indicate that the EU has not bene-
fited as much as the CEECs from the removal of trade barriers, but
the EU exports to CEECs have been steadily increasing.62 Also, the
EU members that border the CEECs have established stronger
trade relations than the EU members that are not geographically
located near the CEECs.63
Although the Europe Agreements have opened trade on some
goods between the CEECs and the EU, enlargement will extinguish
trade barriers entirely.64 Enlargement will not have a large effect
on overall trade, but will most likely have its greatest impact on
certain sectors, especially agriculture.65 The potentially large effect
on agriculture leads to the greatest topic of debate. The agricul-
tural industry was not included in the Europe Agreements, 66 and
enlargement would guarantee that the CEECs' farmers would gain
access to the EU market, and vice versa.67
60 See supra Section 2.1 (describing the impact of the Europe Agreements on
the EU and the CEECs).
61 In 2000, applicants exported 62% of their goods to the EU, as compared to
48% in 1994. In 1999, Poland, the largest CEEC, exported 70.5% of its goods to the
EU, an increase of 7.5% from 1994. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note
10, at 22.
62 EU exports to the CEECs represented only 7.7% of the EU's total exports in
1999. Id. However, it should be noted that the EU was already established in the
global economy and did not have as much to benefit from exporting as the
CEECs.
63 Germany, the largest EU member and a border country, has the largest
impact on CEEC trade. IMPACT ON COHESION, supra note 10, at 81.
64 There were exceptions carved out of the Europe Agreements for "sensi-
tive" goods. Chemical fertilizers, footwear, furniture, automobiles, televisions,
radios, and leather products are some of the sensitive goods that did not have
trade barriers removed by the Europe Agreements. Pawel Jackowski, Economic
Integration Through Europe Agreements 5 (2001) (unpublished term paper, on file
with the U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.).
65 IMPACT ON COHESION, supra note 10, at 89.
66 ECONOMIc IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 10, at 21.
67 DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR AGRICULTURE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU AND
ENLARGEMENT 3 (2001), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/extemal
/enlarge/publi/indexen.htm.
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The CEECs rely more heavily on agriculture than the current
EU members, but their production levels are significantly lower
than the EU's farming output.68 Poland and Romania are the two
most populated CEECs, and together, they have about as many
farmers as the entire EU.69 The concern is that enlargement will
crush the CEECs' domestic farmers because they will not be able to
compete with the EU farmers' prices. The short-term effects on
CEEC farming may be substantial, but in the long run, the mem-
bership of CEECs in the EU will likely increase competition and
create further incentives for the EU to develop their new members'
agricultural industries.
There is concern that enlargement will negatively impact agri-
cultural trade, because the EU's development of the CEECs' agri-
cultural production will disadvantage the current members' farm-
ers. The CEECs have enormous amounts of farming acreage and
the EU's financial programs and technology developments will
greatly increase the CEECs' production. If the CEECs' production
reaches that of the current EU, they will overwhelm the EU market
and eliminate the current EU's farmers.
As with most economic issues of enlargement, the EU members
that border the CEECs-Germany, Austria, Greece, Italy, and
Finland-will be most affected.70  The regions of those border
countries that have a considerable farming industry may be nega-
tively affected. However, enlargement will have a beneficial eco-
nomic impact on the EU's entire agricultural trade. The current EU
does not rely heavily on its farming industry, as agriculture only
contributes to 1.5% of the EU's GDP and 4% of employment, and
these percentages are steadily decreasing.71 In addition, the dis-
crepancy in pricing between the CEECs' and the EU's agricultural
68 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 10, at 58 n.40 ("Gross value
added of agriculture in the CEEC-10 is only 16 per cent [sic] of that of the EU-15,
with the CEEC-10 using 46 per cent [sic] of the agricultural area and more than
100 per cent of agricultural employment of the EU-15.").
69 Poland and Romania combined have about 7.3 million farmers, while the
current EU has about 7.6 million farmers. Id.
70 See, e.g., IMPACT ON COHESION, supra note 10, at 89-93 (discussing Germany
and Austria); ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 10, at 23 (explaining
the disparate impact on the border EU members).
71 Since 1989, agricultural employment has decreased 3.2% per year on aver-
age in the EU. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 10, at 55.
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products will diminish as the CEECs conform to the EU's agricul-
tural policies.72
3.2. Investment
The Europe Agreements have had similar effects on capital
movement as they have had on trade relations. Most restrictions
have already been removed and the impact has been significantly
greater for the CEECs than the current EU. 73 Most of the EU in-
vestment in the CEECs has come in the form of foreign direct in-
vestment ("FDI").74 In 1997, about 90% of the FDI flow into the
CEECs had gone to the first group of countries that began acces-
sion negotiations, 75 which correlates with the fact that these coun-
tries have had greater success in establishing their market econo-
mies.76 Similar to trade, there has been a geographical effect on
investment, as most of the FDI flow coming into the CEECs is from
Germany and Austria.77 However, there has been very little capital
flow from the CEECs into the EU.
There are concerns that enlargement will have serious, negative
implications for the current EU because the FDI flow to the CEECs
is not creating an economic benefit for the EU as a whole. EU
businesses may divert capital currently invested within the EU to
72 The CEECs cannot achieve membership without accepting the EU's acquis,
which includes Chapter 7: Agriculture. EUROPEAN UNION, ENLARGEMENT-
CHAPTER 7 - AGRICULTURE, at http://europa.eu.int/conm/enlargement
/negotiations/chapters/chap7/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2001). The CEECs'
farmers must upgrade the quality and sanitation of their farming at a substantial
cost. Therefore, not all CEEC farmers will continue to compete with EU farmers,
and those that do will have to increase their prices to compensate for the increase
in production costs. See ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 10, at 56-
58 (describing the impact on CEEC-EU trade with changing quality standards).
73 Two-thirds of capital flows into the CEECs during the 1990s came from EU
members. However, the amount of capital invested in the CEECs only accounted
for less than 1% of the EU's GDP. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note
10, at 24.
74 See IMPACT ON COHESION, supra note 10, at 95 (discussing investment in the
CEECs).
75 Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and Estonia received 30%,
28%, 26%, 3%, and 1% of the CEECs' total FDI input respectively. Id. at 96.
76 The statistic is remarkable and poses an ironic question: Is the reason that
these countries developed their market economies faster than the other CEECs
because they received such relatively large portions of FDI, or is the reason that
they received the FDI because their economies were the most developed and they
were closer to accession?
77 See IMPACT ON COHESION, supra note 10, at 97 (suggesting that geographical
proximity plays an important part in FDI flows).
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take advantage of the developing CEECs' industries. EU busi-
nesses will invest in the CEECs with the intention of relocation to
take advantage of lower costs and wage rates. The result will be an
economic slowdown in the current EU as many jobs, mostly un-
skilled labor positions, will be compromised. 78
These concerns are legitimate for certain regions of the border
countries and will likely affect specific labor-intensive industries,
such as textiles.79 It is probable that businesses in Austria and
Germany will take advantage of their proximity to the CEECs and
decide to move certain operations across borders. This would
negatively affect the low-skilled labor workers in the current EU
but would serve the EU as a whole with greater economic advan-
tages. Specialization could lead to higher quality products and
make the EU more efficient, with the CEECs specializing in the la-
bor-intensive industries, while the current EU focusing its domes-
tic investment on human capital-intensive goods and technology.8 0
Also, the EU's large trade surpluses with the CEECs can lead to in-
creased exports to them, which could make up for some of the
negative effects of losing the labor-intensive industries. 81
Some of the concerns about the effects that enlargement would
have on current EU investment are exaggerated. Most of the FDI
flow to the CEECs is used to develop non-tradable industries, such
as telecommunications and public utilities.8 2 The FDI is being used
to help develop the CEECs' infrastructure, not to compete with
current EU industries. Also, studies show that businesses view
market access as the main objective of investing in the CEECs.83 If
the goal is market access, and not exploitation of low wages and
costs, then the EU's investment in the CEECs is not a diversion of
78 See id. at 105 (discussing possible job and investment losses in current EU
countries due to accepted gains for CEECs).
79 Id.
80 However, there is a need to develop the technology industries of the
CEECs as well if they hope to achieve a more stable market economy. FDI has not
been geared towards developing the technology of the CEECs, and there is skepti-
cism about enlargement's ability to increase FDI flows with regards to technology.
See DAVID DYKER, THE DYNAMIC IMPACT OF THE CENTRAL-EAST EUROPEAN
ECONOMIcs OF ACCESSION To THE EUROPEAN UNION 18-19 (Sussex European Inst.,
Working Paper No. 06/00, 2000) (describing the potential impact of enlargement
and the need for FDI in the CEECs, especially in the technology sector).
81 IMPACT ON COHESION, supra note 10, at 106.
82 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 10, at 24; IMPACT ON
COHESION, supra note 10, at 105.
83 See ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT, supra note 10, at 24.
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funds, but rather the creation of new investment where there was
none before. Finally, the applicants have been spending great
amounts of time and money to conform to the EU's acquis.84 This
includes upgrading environmental and social standards.85 The re-
sult is that, in the long term, the cost of production and the wage
rate in the CEECs will move towards those of the EU, thus the in-
centive for EU businesses to move operations based solely on those
reasons will fade.
The debate concerning the economic impact of enlargement
will, until accession is completed, continue to focus on predictions
about the future state of the EU. The analyses of the economic
benefits of enlargement were essentially concerned with whether
the EU should strive to enlarge. The EU and representatives of the
member states concluded that enlargement would be beneficial to
the EU. The next question became: What must the EU's governing
bodies do to ensure that enlargement can actually occur? The sim-
ple answer to this question was that the EU's founding treaties had
to be amended to allow for the new members to be democratically
represented in EU governance. The Treaty of Amsterdam was the
first attempt at treaty reformation to pave the way for a twenty-
seven-member EU.
4. TREATY OF NICE AND ENLARGEMENT
The 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") opened
in Turin, Italy, and the Turin Council listed enlargement as one of
the main objectives in amending the treaties.86 Although there was
a consensus that institutional reform to further the EU's democratic
processes was critical for enlargement, the IGC opted to postpone
making decisions on many of these issues.8 7 The Treaty of Am-
84 See, e.g., Strategy Paper 2002, supra note 6, at 80-86 (discussing Turkey's
ongoing reformation of its constitution, laws, and domestic policies in trying to
conform to the EU's acquis, and stating that the country has still been unsuccess-
ful).
85 Id.
86 Presidency Conclusions from the Turin European Council, Mar. 29,1996, at
http://europa.eu.int/en/record/turin.html.
87 The IGC's agenda did not include overhauling the EU but only to try to
make adjustments within the current system. Most of the members agreed that
the best way to encourage democracy would be to increase the use of qualified
majority voting ("QMV") and decrease the use of unanimous voting. Infra Section
4.2.1.1.1. However, without reforming the institutional structures, increasing the
use of QMV was marginally successful. Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, The Reformed Euro-
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sterdam recognized the fact that there were serious changes that
needed to be made to foster enlargement, but major issues such as
the composition of the Commission or how to reweigh the votes of
the Council were not addressed, leaving many parties wondering
whether the EU was stalling its enlargement process.88
Only ten months after the Treaty of Amsterdam went into
force,89 the next IGC commenced on February 14, 2000.90 Its pri-
mary purpose was to address institutional reform issues that were
not resolved in the Treaty of Amsterdam,91 but which were consid-
ered indispensable to the enlargement process. Enlargement
would increase the EU to twenty-seven members, and it would be
essential to increase the democratic mechanisms of the EU govern-
ing bodies accordingly. The IGC reached agreement in December
2000 and each EU member state signed the Treaty of Nice on Feb-
ruary 26, 2001.92 Although there was unanimous agreement to sign
the Treaty of Nice, and the Treaty achieves some success in easing
the transition of enlargement, some of the amendments are contra-
dictory compromises that have undesirable results.
This Section analyzes the Treaty of Nice with respect to
enlargement. Section 4 breaks down the analysis into two subsec-
tions: (1) the enlargement issues left unresolved after the Treaty of
Amsterdam, and (2) the Treaty of Nice's attempt to encourage
enlargement through institutional reform and changes in the EU's
decision-making processes.
pean Union and the Challenge of Enlargement, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 56, 58-59 UJrg Monar & Wolfgang Wessels eds., 2001).
88 Ulrich Sedelmeier, East of Amsterdam: The Implications of the Amsterdam
Treaty for Eastern Enlargement, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AFTER AMSTERDAM 218,
219,236 (Karlheinz Neunreither & Antje Wiener eds., 2000).
89 The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on May 1, 1999. STEFAN
GRILLER ET AL., THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 33 (2000).
90 The IGC began in Brussels, Belgium. EUROPEAN UNION, THE HISTORY OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION: 2000, at http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/2000/2000-en.htm
(last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
91 Jorg Monar calls these issues the "left-overs" of Amsterdam. J~rg Monar,
Continuing and Building on Amsterdam: The Reforms of the Treaty of Nice, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 87, at 321.
92 EUROPEAN UNION, THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: 2001, at
http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/2001/200len.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
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4.1. The Aftermath of the Treaty of Amsterdam
The Treaty of Amsterdam was not successful in specifically re-
forming the governing institutions to help promote a more democ-
ratic, larger EU. However, the Treaty of Amsterdam was not a
complete disappointment with respect to enlargement. The IGC's
biggest reform was amending and adding a number of provisions
that changed where the co-decision process applies.93 The IGC also
put a ceiling of 700 representatives on the Parliament, recognizing
that enlargement could lead to an unmanageable number of Mem-
bers of the European Parliament ("MEP"s).94 Immediately after the
IGC concluded the Treaty of Amsterdam, they added the Protocol
on the Institutions with the Prospect of Enlargement of the EU,
which identified the potential for problems concerning agreement
within the Council and the need for more institutional reform.95
The Amsterdam IGC understood that institutional reform was
needed in order for enlargement to be successful. Most of the EU
legislative processes were governed by unanimous voting, which
meant that any current member of the EU had its own veto power.
In an EU with fifteen members, unanimous voting was workable,
but the prospects of almost doubling the size of the EU meant that
a different form of decision-making would be essential. There
were some areas of governance where the EU applied qualified
majority voting ("QMV'), and most members believed that QMV
should have been extended to more provisions before enlarging
the EU. However, as with areas of institutional reform, the exten-
sion of QMV was left for the next IGC. The irony was that the de-
cision-making process that needed to be changed was the same one
that was keeping the reform from occurring.
93 Co-decision promotes democratic values, as it gives the European Parlia-
ment equal legislative power to the Council. The Treaty of Amsterdam also sim-
plified the co-decision process. EUROPEAN UNION, GLOSSARY: CODECISION
PROCEDURE, at http:// europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000c.htm#c4 (last
visited Feb. 8, 2003). Article 251 of the EC Treaty simplifies the co-decision proc-
ess, and it is applied to fifteen new areas. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997), art. 251 [hereinafter EC TREATY].
94 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 159; see Saryusz-Wolski, supra note 87, at 60
(discussing institutional reform under the Treaty of Amsterdam).
95 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM Protocol on the Institutions with the Prospect of
Enlargement of the European Union.
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4.2. Major Issues Left for Reform at Nice
The Treaty of Amsterdam left many parties unsatisfied with
the EU's commitment to enlargement. Among the malcontents
were Belgium, France, and Italy, countries adamant about the ne-
cessity for institutional reform and who expressed their position in
the Declaration to the Protocol on the Institutions. % When the 2000
IGC commenced in February, it faced pressures from the discon-
tent members and EU governing bodies, as well as from the loom-
ing timetable set for enlargement. This Section focuses on two ar-
eas where the Treaty of Nice made great strides in preparing the
EU for enlargement: (1) institutional reform, and (2) changes in the
EU's decision-making processes.
4.2.1. Changes to the EU's Institutional System
Treaty reform was not legally necessary for enlargement to oc-
cur. However, from a practical standpoint, the EU needed to re-
structure its governing bodies to enable the new members to have
representation. No country would want to join the EU without
having a democratic voice. Therefore, the Treaty of Nice at-
tempted to enhance democracy in the EU by amending the treaties
with regard to the composition and voting power of the Council,
the Commission, and the Parliament.
4.2.1.1. The Council of the European Union
The Council of the European Union is responsible for many of
the legislative functions of the EU.97 The Council is comprised of
96 Belgium, France and Italy observe that, on the basis of the results of
the Intergovernmental Conference, the Treaty of Amsterdam does not
meet the need, reaffirmed at the Madrid European Council, for substan-
tial progress towards reinforcing the institutions.
Those countries consider that such reinforcement is an indispensable
condition for the conclusion of the first accession negotiations.
TREATY OF NICE AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Mar. 10,
2001, Declarations at 6, O.J. (C 80) 1 (2001) [hereinafter TREATY OF NICE].
97 The Council is the main institution for dealing with issues of foreign and
security policy and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The Council is also a
budgetary authority, alongside the Parliament. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WHO'S
WHO IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?: WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL THE TREATY OF NICE MAKE?
9 (2001) [hereinafter WHO'S WHO IN THE EUROPEAN UNION], at .http:
//europa.eu.int/comm/igc2000/dialogue/info/offdoc/guidecitoyenenpdf.
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one representative from each EU member state, each representative
having the authority to act on behalf of the member country.98 The
Council must vote on the legislative proposals and there are vari-
ous threshold requirements, depending on the issue, to determine
whether the Council has voted in favor or against the legislation.
Decisions are made by unanimous voting, QMV, or majority vot-
ing.99
4.2.1.1.1. Qualified Majority Voting
One of the threshold requirements, QMV, was a major issue for
the IGC in Nice. 00 It was obvious to the IGC, and most others, that
the EU needed to alter the QMV structure in order to prepare the
EU for enlargement. If the EU's underlying goal was to promote a
democratic institutional system, then QMV needed to be adjusted
to account for the new members' voting rights. In the Treaty of
Nice,101 the IGC included the Protocol on the Enlargement of the
European Union ("the Protocol"), 102 which addressed most of the
institutional reformation issues. The Treaty of Nice amended the
"definition" of QMV,10 3 which will take effect on January 1, 2007104
and consist of three elements.
First, the QMV threshold, with the re-weighing of votes dis-
cussed below, will be altered to 169 out of 237 votes (71.3%).105
Second, in addition to the threshold requirement, the votes must
represent a majority of the EU members if the Council acts on a
98 Id.
99 For example, the EC Treaty states in Article 13 that the Council is to act by
unanimous vote on a proposal to combat discrimination. EC TREATY art. 13.
100 See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (describing requirements for changes in voting
processes).
101 TREATY OF NICE.
102 This protocol establishes most of the specific implementations for institu-
tional reform. It also repeals the Protocol on the Institutions with the Prospect of
Enlargement of the EU from the Treaty of Amsterdam. TREATY OF NICE Protocol
A.
103 Qualified majority is defined in Article 205(2) of the EC Treaty, which al-
locates the weight of votes and the threshold for QMV. EC TREATY art. 205(2).
The Treaty of Nice changes this. TREATY OF NICE art. 3.
104 TREATY OF NICE art. 3.
105 Id. The Protocol only sets the QMV for the existing EU. When each appli-
cant achieves membership, there will be a section in its accession treaty that estab-
lishes its voting weight. Monar, supra note 91, at 322-27. Once the last of the cur-
rent applicants under negotiation achieve membership the QMV threshold is to be
258 out of 345 votes, or 74.78%.
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proposal of the Commission and must represent two-thirds of the
members if the proposal originated within the Council. 1' 6 Third, in
the most original element of the Protocol, the addition of Treaty on
European Union Article 205(4) will allow any EU member to re-
quest verification that the qualified majority represents at least 62%
of the population of the EU.107 If any of the three elements are not
met, then the Council may not adopt the decision.
4.2.1.1.2. Re-Weighing of Votes in the Council
With the new criteria for meeting a qualified majority decided
upon, there was also a need to re-weigh the votes of the existing
EU members, while keeping in mind that twelve new members
would soon join the EU. There was great concern regarding the
representation of the heavily populated members' votes in the
Council when an issue was to be determined by QMV.108 The
twelve new members are all relatively small in population size,
and since the weight of the votes is based on population, there was
potential for the smaller members to be over-represented in the
Council's QMV. 109
In Article 3 of the Treaty of Nice Protocol, the IGC amended
each current member's voting strength.110 This gives Germany,
Spain, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, the five largest
members, a combined 60% of the voting power, as opposed to the
55% they had before the amendment."' The IGC also included in
the Declaration on the Enlargement of the European Union the vot-
106 ECTREATY art. 205(2).
107 Id.
108 The current weight of votes had the smaller countries being over-
represented. Monar, supra note 91, at 324.
109 The weight of the votes is supposed to be based on the population of the
countries. The applicants are, on average, much smaller than the current EU
members. Therefore, the weight of the votes had to be adjusted or the over-
representation of the smaller countries would reach an unmanageable level. Id. at
323-24.
110 The Treaty of Nice adjusts the weight of the votes in the Council as fol-
lows: 1) Germany - 29; 2) France - 29; 3) United Kingdom - 29; 4) Italy - 29; 5)
Spain - 27; 6) the Netherlands - 13; 7) Belgium - 12; 8) Greece - 12; 9) Portugal - 12;
10) Austria - 10; 11) Sweden - 10; 12) Denmark - 7; 13) Ireland - 7; 14) Finland - 7;
and 15) Luxembourg - 4. TREATY OF NICE Protocol A, art. 3.
111 The current weights of the "big five" are as follows: Germany, France, It-
aly, and the United Kingdom all have ten votes, and Spain has eight votes. These
forty-eight votes comprise about 55% of the total eighty-seven votes. See Ec
TREATY art. 205(2) (listing the weighting of the votes).
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ing weights of each of the applicant countries that will apply once
they achieve membership.112  In support of democracy and
enlargement, the IGC refused to give more weight to current
members that had comparable populations to the new members.
4.2.1.1.3. Impact on the Council
It was necessary to change the structure of QMV and to re-
weigh the votes for the current members and potential members.
The IGC may have introduced some new anomalies in attempting
to redress the problem of the smaller members' over-
representation, but if one looks at the Treaty of Nice in its entirety,
including the protocols and declarations, the IGC was successful.
The Treaty of Nice increases the relative weight of the five biggest
members in QMV. 113 However, if we look at some of the members
individually, their representation has actually diminished. As J6rg
Monar writes, "Currently Germany-which has more than double
the population-has 25 per cent [sic] more votes than Spain. Un-
der the new arrangements this margin, rather than increasing, will
shrink to 7.4 per cent [sic].""14
One must wonder why Germany, as the most populated EU
member, would accept this reduction in power with regard to the
weight of its votes. The reason is that the IGC compensated Ger-
many by adding the third element of the new definition of QMV as
a "significant blocking" mechanism.115 Germany, France, Italy, and
the United Kingdom are the four most populated EU members; a
combination of any three of the four would give them a "blocking"
minority because they would represent greater than 38% of the
EU's population.1 6 Moreover, Germany and any one of Italy,
112 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of new
membership on QMV). After the EU has accepted its twenty-seventh member, the
weights of the new members will be as follows: 1) Poland - 27; 2) Romania - 14; 3)
the Czech Republic - 12; 4) Hungary - 12; 5) Bulgaria - 10; 6) Slovakia - 7; 7)
Lithuania - 7; 8) Latvia - 4; 9) Slovenia - 4; 10) Estonia - 4; 11) Cyprus - 4; and 12)
Malta - 3. The current EU's votes will stay the same as what was set in the Proto-
col. TREATY OF NICE Declaration.
113 TREATY OF NIcE Protocol A, art. 3.
114 Monar, supra note 91, at 324.
115 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (describing the new element of
population verification as a part of QMV).
116 Monar, supra note 91, at 324-25.
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France, or the United Kingdom would also represent enough of the
population to block any Council decision.117
4.2.1.2. Reform of the Commission
The European Commission is responsible for initiating most of
the EU's legislative processes and for implementing the EU's over-
all policies.118 It also serves a monitoring function, as it is respon-
sible for the EU's adherence to its treaties and institutional deci-
sions.1 19  The Commission currently consists of twenty
commissioners, two each from Germany, Italy, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and France, and one each from the other EU members. 120
Article 4(1) of the Protocol states that, beginning in 2005, each
EU member will only be allowed one Commissioner.' 21 The
Commission will include one representative from each applicant
when it enters the EU. 22
The most interesting change that the Treaty of Nice made con-
cerning the institutional structure of the Commission is that once
the twenty-seventh member joins the EU, "[t]he number of Mem-
bers of the Commission shall be less than the number of Member
States." 23 This will be the first time in the history of the Commis-
sion that each member state will not be represented at all times
during meetings. The Council has been given the responsibility of
setting the number of Commissioners and of developing a system-
atic rotation for the Commission's representation. 24 The purpose
is to enable the Commission to function, as the IGC assumed that a
Commission comprised of twenty-seven members could not be ef-
fective or efficient. However, there are still concerns about equal-
ity and fairness. How many Commissioners would be able to func-
tion effectively? How will the Council determine whom to rotate
117 Id. at 325.
118 The Commission works closely with the members' domestic administra-
tions concerning the implementation of the EU's common policies. The Commis-
sion is also responsible for international negotiations, serving as the EU's repre-
sentative for external affairs. See WHO'S WHO IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note
97, at 13.
119 Id.
120 EUROPEAN UNION, THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION, at http://europa.eu.int
/comm/role_en.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
121 TREATY OF NICE Protocol A, art. 4(1).
122 Id.
123 TREATY OF NICE Protocol A, art. 4(2).
124 TREATY OF NICE Protocol A, art. 4(3).
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and when? Members may be concerned that decisions made by
the Commission during periods when they are unrepresented may
not be in their best interests.
4.2.1.3. The European Parliament
The reforms to the European Parliament are "among the most
puzzling of the Nice negotiations." 125 The IGC in Amsterdam ad-
dressed the problem of an unmanageable Parliament by limiting
the total number of MEPs to 700. Only a few months later, the IGC
in Nice amended Article 190(3) of the TEC in the Protocol to allow
a maximum of 732 MEPs.126 There does not seem to be any legiti-
mate reason why the IGC felt that the Parliament could not adhere
to the 700 MEP limit. The thought of adding twelve new members
to the EU with many new languages and interests might suggest
that the Parliament needs fewer MEPs to achieve its goals, not
more.
There is also some concern about the IGC's decisions concern-
ing the seat allocation in the Parliament. Germany and Luxem-
bourg are the only current members that will keep their current
number of seats. 127 The criticism comes from the CEECs, because
the Parliament's composition is not supposed to favor current
members; rather, it is supposed to be based proportionately on
population. However, many of the EU's current members have
been allotted greater representation than CEECs with larger popu-
lations.128 This result is a loss for democracy and enlargement; if
the EU truly intends to incorporate the CEECs as equals, then the
CEECs must have greater representation than current members
with smaller populations.
125 Monar, supra note 91, at 325.
126 TREATY OF NICE Protocol A, art. 2.
127 Compare EC TREATY art. 190 (giving Germany ninety-nine representatives
in the Parliament and giving Luxembourg six representatives), with TREATY OF
NICE Protocol A, art. 2 (showing that Germany and Luxembourg are the only EU
members that maintain the same number of representatives in the Parliament).
128 For example, the Czech Republic and Hungary have larger populations
than Belgium and Portugal, yet Belgium and Portugal will get twenty-two MEPs,
while the Czech Republic and Hungary will only receive twenty. Monar, supra
note 91, at 326. For the number of representatives allotted to the current EU
members and the applicants after all twelve applicants have joined the EU, see
TREATY OF NICE Declaration.
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4.2.2. Changes in Decision-Making
The treaty reform of the Council, the Commission, and the Par-
liament helped the potential new members gain representation
within the governing bodies. Equally important as the issue of
representation was the issue of decision-making within the institu-
tions. Enlargement makes it essential to change the ways in which
the institutions implement new policies and laws. Adding many
new members means that there will be an influx of fresh ideas, but
it may come with the price of stagnation because of the inability to
come to agreement. The Treaty of Nice attempts to reconcile this
potential problem by increasing the number of areas where QMV,
rather than unanimous voting, meets the requirement, as well as
by redefining the parameters of enhanced cooperation.
4.2.2.1. Changes From Unanimous Voting to Qualified
Majority Voting
The IGC's purpose in amending the QMV procedure was based
on the idea that the EU wanted to increase the use of QMV in deci-
sion-making. Unanimous voting was hindering the EU's institu-
tions in their decision-making, as it essentially gave each of the fif-
teen members its own veto power.129 Adding twelve new
members would only put a stronger hold on the EU's democratic
processes if unanimity continued to be required for major policy
issues.
The Treaty of Nice increased the number of decision-making
issues that required QMV by thirty-five. 30 Some of the major
amendments from unanimous voting to QMV that go into effect
with the ratification of the Treaty of Nice are the amendment giv-
ing every citizen the right to free movement among the EU mem-
bers,' 3' the amendment governing the common commercial pol-
icy, 132 and the amendment providing economic, financial, and
129 XINOPHON A. YATAGANAS, THE TREATY OF NICE: THE SHARING OF POWER
AND THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION-A CONTINENTAL
PERSPECTIVE 15 (Harvard Law School, Jean Monnet Paper No. 1, 2001).
130 The Treaty of Nice amendments do not all enter into force at the same
time. Some of the amendments are effective as soon as the Treaty of Nice is rati-
fied, while others have been set for a later date (the Protocols), and still others re-
quire further decisions by the Council to establish starting dates.
131 TREATY OF NICE art. 2(3).
132 Id. art. 2(8).
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technical cooperation with third countries. 33 Although Romano
Prodi, President of the Commission, had highlighted five sensitive
policy areas for enlargement that he considered essential to change
to QMV,134 there was minimal success in resolving these core is-
sues.
4.2.2.2. Enhanced Cooperation
The Treaty of Amsterdam established "closer cooperation" as a
means for allowing members with common interests to enter into
agreements to promote those interests without binding the EU as a
whole.135 However, any member's Council representative who has
legitimate and stated reasons why the closer cooperation should
not be allowed may "veto" closer cooperation. 136 Closer coopera-
tion is a valuable concept, but as with other areas of institutional
and decision-making reforms, there is the need to promote a more
democratic system with enlargement on its way.
The IGC in Nice supported the idea of closer cooperation but
amended the TEU and TEC with regard to the requirements for the
new, enhanced cooperation. 137 Some argue that this was the most
successful area of reform that the Treaty of Nice had in relation to
enlargement, as there were sixteen changes made to the TEU and
TEC138 Through the amendments, the IGC sought to strike a new
balance between the interests of the willing and the protection of
the EU/EC acquis and of the unwilling or unable.139 The main con-
cem was the veto power that each member of the Council was
given to strike down any proposed cooperation. Enhanced coop-
eration would become obsolete in an EU with twenty-seven mem-
bers tinless there was some democratic reform. The Treaty extin-
guished the veto power and replaced the previous majority
133 Id. art. 2(16).
134 In the Treaty of Nice, these policy areas are: 1) social policy (arts. 42 and
37); 2) visas, asylum, and immigration issues (art. 67); 3) taxation (arts. 93, 94, and
175); 4) common commercial policy (art. 133); and 5) cohesion policy (art. 161).
135 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 1(12).
136 TEU art. 40(2).
137 The Treaty of Nice abolished the use of the term "closer" and replaced it
with "enhanced" to emphasize the new qualities of the cooperation process.
TREATY OF NICE arts. 1(13), 2(1).
138 Monar, supra note 91, at 322.
139 Id. at 330.
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participation requirement with Article 43(g), requiring a minimum
of eight EU members to take part in the cooperation.140
5. RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF NICE
The IGC closed its negotiations in Nice on December 11, 2000.
The Presidency Conclusions state that they reached agreement on
the Treaty of Nice and that they hoped to sign it in early 2001.141
The President was confident that "[t]his new treaty strengthens the
legitimacy, effectiveness and public acceptability of the institutions
and enables the Union's firm commitment to the enlargement
process to be reaffirmed." 142 The IGC members reconvened in
Nice, and on February 26, 2001, they signed the Treaty of Nice. 43
The Treaty required that every EU member ratify the document
before it could go into force. As stated earlier, the IGC representa-
tive of each member had already signed the Treaty, but the ratifica-
tion process could be different for each member, as it was gov-
erned by the domestic constitutional requirements.144 Eleven of the
twelve current EU members had governmental procedures for rati-
fying treaties. Ireland was the only EU member that required its
citizens' approval to ratify a treaty.
This Section analyzes the Treaty of Nice's ratification process.
There is great emphasis on Ireland, not only due to its unique rati-
fication process, but also because of its previous rejection of the
Treaty of Nice. The first Subsection looks at the first Irish referen-
dum. In 2001, the Irish referendum was against adoption of the
Treaty of Nice. The other members continued with their ratifica-
tion processes despite the Irish rejection. The second Subsection
discusses the EU's response to the first referendum. The third Sub-
section discusses Ireland's decision on how to implement the
Treaty of Nice. The fourth Subsection presents the current status
of the ratification process and the EU's future goals for enlarge-
ment.
140 TREATY OF NICE art. 1(11).
141 Nice Conclusions, supra note 40, para. 3.
142 Id. para. 4.
143 THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: 2000, supra note 90.
144 TEU art. 48.
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5.1. The First Irish Referendum
Article 48 of the TEU sets out the institutional process for the
EU when amending a founding treaty.145 After the EU's institu-
tions finished their processes, every EU member had to ratify the
treaty amendments according to its constitutional standards.146 For
Ireland, this meant that the amendments had to be voted on by its
citizens. Article 46 of the Irish Constitution governed amendments
to the Irish Constitution, and it had been decided that this Article
was the relevant provision for amending EU treaties in Ireland. 147
Article 46 required that any amendment first be proposed by the
legislation in the form of a bill, which must then be put to the Irish
people in the form of a referendum after it is passed.148
Many Irish political groups started strong campaigns to defeat
the adoption of the Treaty of Nice. Each group had its specific
platform, but there were a few broad arguments. The main argu-
ment made by anti-Nice campaigners was that the Treaty of Nice
threatened Ireland's neutral position concerning defense. The
Treaty establishes a security committee with the authority to take
military action in international crises.149 Some felt that Ireland
would be bullied into NATO, even though the country specifically
adopted a neutral position.' 5°
Another Irish concern was that the Treaty of Nice gave more
power to large members of the EU, taking away Ireland's relative
power with regard to the Council and the Commission. The Treaty
of Nice actually centralizes power, they argued, not creating a de-
mocratic EU. The Irish political activists won the initial battle, and
on June 7, 2001, the Irish citizens voted against ratifying the Treaty
of Nice.151
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Art. 46, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
148 Id.
149 TREATY OF NICE art. 1(5) (amending Article 25 of the EC Treaty).
150 Afri-Action from Ireland is a non-governmental organization that has
adopted this position. See http://www.afri.buz.org/, for more information about
Afri and its position.
151 Article 47 of the Irish Constitution requires that there be a minimum vote
of 33.3% of the population for a referendum to be valid if it does not amend the
Constitution. However, since the ratification of the Treaty of Nice would require
an amendment, Article 47(1) only says that there must be a majority vote, and has
no threshold requirement. Art. 47, Constitution of Ireland, 1937. The turnout was
among the lowest for an Irish referendum ever. Only 34.8% of Ireland's voting
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5.2. The EU's Response to the First Referendum
The Irish people spoke with a collective voice concerning the
Treaty of Nice. Ireland's "No" vote was supposed to mean that the
Treaty could not enter into force, regardless of the results of the
other members' ratification processes. However, since Ireland's
referendum in June 2001, the other members have continued with
ratification.
The commonalities among the members' ratification processes
are that they all require their respective parliamentary branches to
approve the treaty; after parliamentary approval, 5 2 the execu-
tive/royal body must formally sign on behalf of the member
state. 5 3 After domestic ratification, the EU has a formal date of
lodging that it considers to be the official day that the member ac-
cepted the Treaty. The Treaty of Nice would enter into force on the
first day of the second month after the last member lodged its rati-
fication instrument. 54
Why did the members continue with their ratification processes
when they legally could not adopt the Treaty of Nice without the
ratification of all of the members? It was essential for enlargement
that the EU continue to show its solidarity. The current members
did not want the applicants to lose faith in the EU and its decision-
making ability. Also, they wanted to show that they fully sup-
ported enlargement.
Current members also wanted the Irish people to recognize
that they were the sole dissenters, hoping that this would apply
pressure to seek a solution that the Irish could accept. As President
Prodi of the European Commission said, "[r]emember that the de-
population cast a vote. Nicola Byrne, Anti-Nice Protestors Turn Up Heat, OBSERVER
(London online edition), June 24, 2001, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu
/story/0,7369,511870,00.html. The final vote was 453,461 (46.13%) in favor of rati-
fication and 529,478 (53.87%) against.
152 The Europa website has an updated graph charting the progress of each
member's ratification process. For example, Germany must get approval from the
Bundestag and Bundesrat divisions of its parliament. EUROPEAN UNION, TREATY
OF NICE- RATIFICATION SITUATION (2002) [hereinafter Ratification Chart], at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/nice-treaty/indexen.htm#.
153 For example, Denmark's parliamentary body, Folketing, drafted a law
adopting the Treaty of Nice on June 1, 2001, and the Queen of Denmark signed
the law on June 7, 2001. Id.
154 TREATY OF NICE art. 12(2).
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cision, which is yours alone to make, will have a decisive impact
on the future direction of the entire continent."55
5.3. Ireland's Decision to Ratify the Treaty of Nice
By the end of August 2002, every EU member, except for Ire-
land, had completed its ratification process and the EU had noted
its official lodging. 156 The Irish government was perplexed by the
situation that had developed. Much of the Irish dissent revolved
around the worry that Ireland would be giving up its neutral mili-
tary position if it ratified the Treaty of Nice. 5 7
The Irish government felt that this was a misconception of the
Treaty's purpose. There was poor voter turnout for the first refer-
endum and the government attributed this to the belief that the
citizens were not fully informed of the benefits of the Treaty. The
government devised a pro-Nice campaign to better inform the pub-
lic, in the hopes that more Irish citizens would take a stance in fa-
vor of the Treaty of Nice. 58
The main purpose of the pro-Nice campaign was to assure the
Irish people that the foundation of the Treaty of Nice was to en-
155 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Why Nice is Needed (June 26, 2001) (statement
of President Romano Prodi), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners
/prodi/niceen.htm.
156 The following is a list of the accepting members' dates of lodging: Den-
mark - June 13, 2001; Luxembourg - September 24, 2001; France - October 19, 2001;
Spain - December 27, 2001; the Netherlands - December 28, 2001; Austria - January
8, 2002; Portugal - January 18, 2002; Sweden - January 25, 2002; Finland - January
29, 2002; Germany - February 11, 2002; Greece - June 3., 2002; Italy - July 9, 2002;
United Kingdom - July 25, 2002; and Belgium - August 26, 2002. Ratification
Chart, supra note 152.
157 Patricia McKenna is a MEP and represents the Green Party of Ireland.
Her website publishes articles supporting the Green Party's political positions.
"Ireland's neutrality has been dismantled with incredible deception and thor-
oughness by this Government: The Amsterdam Treaty, NATO's Partnership for
Peace, the Rapid Reaction Force, and now the Nice Treaty have left our neutrality
in shreds." Patricia McKenna Green Party Homepage, Government Attempts to Sell
Nice as Treaty of Enlargement a Marketing Ploy, Claim Greens (May 8, 2001), at
http://www.pmckenna.com/media/statements/2001/01.05.08.html.
158 The Irish government published documents explaining the intricacies of
the Treaty of Nice, but it also took a strong stance in letting the citizens know that
the government strongly favored the Treaty of Nice and considered it essential to
maintaining healthy EU relations. See DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, WHITE PAPER ON THE TREATY OF NICE AND SEVILLE
DECLARATIONS (2002), at http://www.gov.ie/iveagh/nice/NiceTreaty.pdf.
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hance enlargement, not to create a strong EU military force. 5 9 The
government presented the National Declaration by Ireland at the
Seville European Council on June 21, 2002.160 The Declaration
stated that Ireland continued to support the EU's goal of enlarge-
ment and firmly restated Ireland's neutral position concerning
military force.' 61 The Declaration explicitly states that, "[i]n line
with its traditional policy of military neutrality, Ireland is not
bound by any mutual defence commitment. Nor is Ireland party
to any plans to develop a European army."' 62
The Council accepted Ireland's Declaration and formally
documented its own declaration.163 The Council recognized that
Ireland's Declaration was a condition of Ireland's work towards
the ratification of the Treaty of Nice.164 This was not a unique posi-
tion; as with every EU treaty, there were members who carved out
specific positions via declarations. However, Ireland was not stat-
ing its exception to the stated position. "The European Council
recognises that, like all Member States of the Union, Ireland would
retain the right, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice,
to take its own sovereign decision.., on whether to commit mili-
tary personnel to participate in any operation carried out ..... 165
The aforementioned declarations were made for the benefit and
comfort of the Irish citizens. They did not alter Ireland's or the
EU's former positions concerning military advancement. The dec-
larations clarified the military positions of the EU and Ireland.
Neither Ireland nor the EU adopted different positions than they
had taken before.
The next step for the Irish government was to ratify the Treaty
of Nice. There could not be an identical referendum voting di-
rectly on the Treaty of Nice because this had already been rejected.
Instead, the Irish government introduced the Twenty-Sixth
159 Press Release, Irish Government, Statement by the Government on the
Publication of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the Constitution Bill Uune 27,
2002) [hereinafter Press Release], at http://www.gov.ie/iveagh/nice/stl.htm.
160 TREATY OF NIcE, NATIONAL DECLARATION BY IRELAND, at http://www
.gov.ie/iveagh/nice/st2.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
161 Id.
162 Id. para. 4.
163 TREATY OF NICE, DECLARATION OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WITH RESPECr TO
THE NATIONAL DECLARATION BY IRELAND, at http://www.gov.ie/iveagh/nice
/st3.htm.
164 Id. para. 1.
165 Id. para. 6.
[24:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss1/4
THE TREATY OF NICE
Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2002,166 which only differed
from the past proposed amendment by adding a third part.167
The Amendment Bill consists of three parts. The first part
would allow the State to ratify the Treaty of Nice.168 The second
part of the Amendment Bill allows for Ireland to participate in en-
hanced cooperation as proscribed in Articles 1.6, 1.9, 1.11, 1.12,
1.13, and 2.1 of the Treaty of Nice, but not without the prior con-
sent of both Houses of the Oireachtas.169 The third part explicitly
provides that "[tihe State shall not adopt a decision taken by the
European Council to establish a common defence pursuant to Arti-
cle 1.2 of the Treaty... where that common defence would include
the State."170
The two Houses of the Oireachtas, the Irish Parliament, were
presented with the Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution
Bill on June 27, 2002.171 Ddil tireann passed the Amendment Bill
on September 11, 2002, and the Seanad 1tireann passed the bill two
days later, on September 13, 2002.172 These were not the significant
events, as the entire EU awaited the second Irish referendum.
The second referendum was held on October 19, 2002. This
time the outcome was in favor of the Treaty of Nice. 173 While the
first referendum was only voted on by 34.8% of Ireland's voting
population, the second referendum drew about 48% of the Irish
voting population. 74 The final form of the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment is identical to the Amendment Bill, and 62.89% of the Irish
166 The Bill and its explanatory memorandum are reproduced at the Gov-
ernment of Ireland's official website. Ireland, Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution Bill (2002), available at http://www.gov.ie/bills28/bills/2002/3202
/default.htm.
167 Irish activists who oppose the Treaty of Nice found this addition of the
third clause to the referendum to be "irrelevant spin-doctoring." The Constitu-
tional Outrage of Re-Running Nice, NAT'L PLATFORM, at http://www
.nationalplatform .org/notnice/constitutional_outrage.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2003).
168 The Bill was adopted without any alterations, therefore, the language of
the 26th Amendment is identical to that of the Bill. Amend. 26, pt. 2(7), Constitu-
tion of Ireland.
169 Amend. 26, pt. 2(8), Constitution of Ireland, 2002.
170 Amend. 26, pt. 2(9), Constitution of Ireland, 2002.
171 Press Release, supra note 159.
172 Id.
173 'Yes' Camp Wins Irish Vote, CNN.CoM/WRLD, Oct. 20, 2002, at http:
//www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/10/20/ireland.eu/.
174 The Empire Strikes Back, NAT'L PLATFORM, Oct. 21, 2002, at http:
/ /www.nationalplatform.org/statements/021021_dark.html.
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voters voted in favor of allowing the State to ratify the Treaty of
Nice. 75
5.4. The Current State of Affairs
The EU has accomplished its goal by ratifying the Treaty of
Nice. This is not to say that the public is satisfied with the results.
The strong anti-Nice contingency in Ireland is not the only party
that has negative feelings towards enlargement and the Treaty.
There is a broad distrust of enlargement in the current EU, as the
public is not certain that the information they are being fed about
the positive impacts of enlargement is true.
The ratification situation in Ireland is just one example of the
current public fears coming true. The EU's goal was and is
enlargement. The governmental bodies have shown that they will
use whatever means necessary in order to achieve that goal. This
goal may be achieved at the cost of losing the faith of their own
citizens.
The European Parliament recently published the results from a
public opinion poll that it conducted.176 As could be anticipated,
the results of the poll varied according to whether the respondent
was a citizen of the current EU or of a candidate country. The poll
showed that citizens of the candidate countries are almost entirely
in favor of enlargement, while the citizens of the current EU mem-
bers are greatly varied in their opinions.177
Seventy-one percent of current EU citizens believe that
enlargement is a personal advantage or an advantage on the
whole.178 There is also a common belief that enlargement will in-
175 The results of the second referendum were posted by the Irish Times
online website. Referendum Results 2002, IRISH TIMES (Online Edition), at http:
//www.ireland.com/focus/nice/results.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
176 The results are posted on the European Parliament's website. The poll
consisted of seven questions. The poll results are organized in four separate
graphs. The first graph represents the opinions of the current EU members and is
divided into the percentage results by each member country, as well as the cur-
rent EU as a whole. The second graph represents the results from the candidate
countries. The third graph is broken into three socio-demographics: gender, age,
and occupation. The fourth group of graphs are pie charts representing the total
results of the poll. EUROPEAN UNION, ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF INTERNET
QUESTIONNAIRE ON ENLARGEMENT IN ON EUROPARL, at http://europoll.ibicenter.net
/default.asp?LANGUAGE=EN&WHEREAMI = (last visited Feb. 4,2003).
177 Id. The Netherlands' citizens are the most skeptical with respect to the
positive contributions of enlargement.
178 Id. Graph 1, Question 1.
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crease the EU's international influence, as 77% of the current citi-
zens believe this to be true.1 79 There are, however, negative impli-
cations, as 41% of current EU citizens believe that enlargement will
lead to higher unemployment,180 74% agree that enlargement will
make it more complicated for the EU to operate,s' and 49% of cur-
rent citizens do not believe they are properly informed on the ef-
fects of enlargement. 82
Over 90% of the citizens from the candidate countries believe
that enlargement will be a personal advantage or an advantage on
the whole, will increase the EU's international influence, and will
be good for the EU's businesses. 83 Only 48% of candidate citizens
indicated that they think enlargement will make it more compli-
cated for the EU to operate. 84 An even smaller percentage, 21%,
think enlargement will lead to higher unemployment in the EU.185
Seventy-one percent stated that they believe they are well in-
formed about enlargement. 8 6
These results support many of the opinions of the parties who
oppose enlargement and the Treaty of Nice. There is a feeling that
enlargement will only benefit the economic interests of the new
members, and that the EU's political motives are best served by
enlargement, not the overall interests of the current EU commu-
nity. The most telling of all public opinion polls, the Irish referen-
dum, was dismissed when the EU did not gain the desired result.
Instead of respecting the opinions of the majority of the Irish vot-
ers, the EU and the Irish government strengthened their efforts to
ensure they could achieve their political agendas.
179 Id. Question 2.
180 Id. Question 4. Most of the border countries have a higher percentage of
their citizens believing that enlargement will lead to higher unemployment.
181 Id. Question 5.
182 Id. Question 6. Ireland has the second highest percentage of citizens who
feel that they are well informed about enlargement. This is not a surprising result
due to the large governmental campaign after the first referendum.
183 Id. Questions 1-3.
184 Id. Question 5.
185 Id. Question 4.
186 Id. Question 6. This result is expected because enlargement is centered
around the membership of the candidate countries. Unlike the EU's current citi-
zens who may need convincing that enlargement is beneficial, the candidate coun-
tries' citizens have been anticipating membership for some time.
2003]
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6. CONCLUSION
The EU will expand to twenty-five members in 2004. The EU's
governing bodies have worked vigorously to meet its aspirations
for enlargement. The EU, the members' governments, and the
candidate countries' governments have done their part to make
membership a reality for the candidates. Although the Treaty of
Nice was not legally necessary to enable the candidates to join,
with enlargement deadlines looming, it was essential that the EU
members ratify the Treaty.
There is a certain degree of irony in Ireland's ratification of the
Treaty; the Treaty of Nice and enlargement are supposed to intro-
duce a new democracy for the EU. Many strides were taken to en-
sure that new members would have representation among the
EU's governing bodies. Yet, the democracy does not appear to ex-
tend to the EU's citizens. The Irish people were told to vote again
on the Treaty of Nice because their first decision was not accept-
able. The polled citizens of the current EU do not feel as if they are
well informed about how enlargement will impact their lives, and
there are many questions left to be answered about the economic
impact enlargement will have on trade, investment, immigration,
and jobs. The only certainty seems to be that the next decade will
prove to be a momentous era for the EU.
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